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New Brunswick’s Artillery Goes 
to War, 1914-1915
L E E  W I N D S O R  & 
R O G E R  S A R T Y
Abstract: This case study of artillery units from New Brunswick examines 
the role of the Militia in Canada’s mobilisation for the First World 
War, from August 1914 through the Second Battle of Ypres in A pril-  
May 1915, the Canadian forces’ first major combat. It shows that the 
Militia artillery in the province provided a strong basis, in organisation 
and in the considerable number of serving and former members, for 
both emergency home defence measures and raising units for overseas 
service. The piece also demonstrates the strong provincial identity of 
the gunners. The largest unit, the 3rd Regiment of Saint John, made a 
determined effort to raise “New Brunsw ick” units for overseas service, 
and succeeded because of its ability promptly to provide capable personnel 
in fully sufficient numbers.
New B runswick’s militia artillery units played a significant but little-known role in the First World War for home defence and 
in recruiting and training personnel for overseas service. Published 
work on Canada’s military effort of 1914-18 has rightly given priority 
to the overseas corps and particularly to the infantry. Treatment of 
the corps artillery has been less extensive, and there has been little 
work on the units of the Militia in Canada— the nation’s traditional 
military force. The present article shows how peacetime organisation 
enabled New Brunswick’s artillery units to make an early contribution 
— notably at the Second Battle of Ypres, the Canadian division’s first
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The 3rd R egim ents Foreign Service Battery assem bling on Partridge Island for departure to 
Valcartier, A ugust 1914. [Heritage Resources, Saint John]
major battle— in circumstances that had only been faintly glimpsed 
before the outbreak of war.
This account supports other challenges to the view that Canada’s 
mobilisation was a chaotic improvisation. Yet, at the time, New 
Brunswick’s gunners protested that their best people were being 
scattered to fill gaps in the whole range of artillery units, thus denying 
recognition afforded other provinces by the concentration of their people 
in units that represented particular cities and regions. Those protests 
bore fruit. The expansion of the British and Canadian artillery in 
response to the battles of early 1915 brought a prominent place at 
the front for distinctly “New Brunswick” units that were recruited 
throughout the province and organised and trained at Saint John.
By 1914 the Canadian Artillery was organised in two branches 
on the model of Britain’s Royal Artillery. The Canadian Garrison 
Artillery was responsible for heavy mobile guns (generally 4.7-inch 
and larger) and for fortress armament, principally the defended ports 
of Halifax, Quebec City, and Esquimalt, b c . The Canadian Field 
Artillery was equipped with lighter mobile guns for service in field 
forces. In New Brunswick, the 3rd Regiment, Canadian Garrison 
Artillery at Saint John traced its history back to 1793 when the 
first citizen-gunners came out to garrison the shore batteries that 
protected that port during the French Revolutionary War. After
2
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1904-5 when the Canadian government followed British practice and 
concentrated coastal defences at major naval ports— Halifax on the 
East Coast— the regiment switched from training on fixed coastal 
guns to mobile armament. On mobilisation it was to move to Halifax, 
and crew the mobile guns that were based at the citadel in the centre 
of the city, ready to move rapidly with infantry and cavalry to resist 
enemy landing forces.
The regiment was not only deeply rooted in Saint John, but had 
strong connections through its serving and many former members 
throughout the province. Lieutenant-Colonel Beverley R . Armstrong, 
the commanding officer, was a leading lawyer and businessman in 
Saint John. A  veteran of the South African War, he had lost his right 
leg as a result of injuries suffered in combat. Such was Armstrong’s 
drive and network of contacts that, even while continuing in 
command throughout the war, he also became a senior staff officer 
with responsibility first for the recruiting, and then for the ocean 
transport, of overseas contingents from Halifax.
New Brunswick’s other artillery unit, the 4th Brigade, Canadian 
Field Artillery, came into existence in 1905. The brigade brought 
together the 10th (Woodstock) and 12th (Newcastle) batteries— both 
of which dated to the 1860s— with a newly authorised unit, the 19th 
Battery at Moncton. The new unit took shape only in 1907 when 
Major Samuel Boyd Anderson assumed command. A  native of Port 
Elgin, New Brunswick, he was a school teacher and principal who 
in his late thirties took up a new career as an insurance broker. 
Anderson joined the local militia infantry regiment in 1893 when he 
was only seventeen years old and had served continuously while rising 
through the ranks. Under his leadership the new battery became the 
most active unit in the brigade.
On 29 July 1914 Britain dispatched the “precautionary” war 
telegram to all parts of the British Empire, and its dominions and 
colonies began partial mobilisation of forces to secure strategic 
centres, especially on the seacoasts. On Canada’s east coast, militia 
detachments came out to supplement the permanent fortress garrisons 
at Halifax and Quebec City. Mobilisation stepped into higher gear on 
3 August in response to a report from Heart’s Content, Newfoundland 
that two German cruisers had been sighted. Maritime Provinces 
Command, known after 1911 as the 6th Division with headquarters
3
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at Halifax under Major-General R.W. Rutherford, took the threat 
seriously, and within hours full mobilisation was underway.1
Rutherford and his staff, however, had to change the plans on the 
fly. Based on the worst-case scenario of war with the United States, 
the plans concentrated defences at Halifax, the major British imperial 
naval and military base in the northwestern Atlantic. The Americans 
would have to seize the Nova Scotian capital in a major assault if 
they were to isolate Canada from British military assistance upon 
which the defence of the Dominion would ultimately depend. By 
contrast, the greatest danger from Germany was hit-and-run long- 
range bombardments of any and all coastal towns by fast and elusive 
German cruisers. The goal would be to terrorise the commercial 
shippers and thus interfere with the ocean trade upon which Britain’s 
economy and war-making potential depended.2
Saint John, the most important commercial port on the East 
Coast, was a logical target for such a terror campaign. The 6th Division 
cancelled the 3rd Regiment’s deployment to Halifax, and instead 
ordered the unit to raise a single active service battery of six officers 
and 113 other ranks to crew four 4.7-inch mobile guns that were being 
rushed to Saint John from Ontario, for a coast defence role. The local 
press reported the mobilisation on 4 August. “One battery will be 
mobilised and Major F.C. Magee will be in command,” reported The 
Saint John Globe. “There are some big 4.7-inch guns expected to 
arrive today from Petawawa for the local corps.”3 The next morning, 
5 August, the 3rd Regiment’s newly organised “composite” battery 
assembled for drill.4 That same day the Globe printed a report from 
Portland, Maine that early in the morning shots were heard off the 
coast. A  further report from New York added “Eight cruisers— three
1 Brian Tennyson and Roger Sarty, Guardian of the Gulf: Sydney, Cape Breton, and 
the Atlantic Wars, 1785-1991 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 113-4.
2 “Canada. Halifax Defence Scheme. Revised April 1914,” table D (ii) “Distribution 
of Garrison and Armament at the War Stage,” seen at National Defence Headquarters 
(NDHQ) Library, c 1981.
3 Saint John Globe, 4 August 1914, 9. The account in this and the other articles 
from this newspaper cited below is confirmed by the short daily telegraphed 
reports by OC 6th Division to Ottawa in File HQC 95 pt 4, Library and Archives 
Canada (LAC), RG 24, Box 1198, and the regimental orders, 4-5 August 1914, 
“Regimental Orders 10 June 1898-31 March 1916,” New Brunswick Museum, 3rd 
“New Brunswick” Regiment, Canadian Garrison Artillery collection.
4 Saint John Globe, 5 August 1914, 5.
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German, three British and two French are hovering somewhere off 
this coast. ... The firing may have marked the first engagement... .”B
The guns from Petawawa arrived on 5 August and on 6 August 
were moved out to Partridge Island. The Globe was reassuring about 
the effectiveness of the new defences: “The company of artillery men 
. are the older men in the service who have seen much drill at 
Petawawa. Using the same guns that were used on drill, the gunners 
will be able to give a splendid account of themselves if called upon by 
the events of the great war.”5 6
The detailed coverage of the defence preparations in the press, 
the result of the government not yet imposing effective censorship, 
had the good effect of reassuring the population. So did the frantic 
naval preparations to meet the looming threat. Royal Navy cruisers 
rushed from the West Indies to Halifax, and others then came from 
Great Britain. Although it became clear that the German warships 
were not in northern waters— the alarmist reports had all been false 
— a half-dozen cruisers remained on station at Halifax. Forty percent 
or more of Britain’s overseas trade passed close by Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland en route across the Atlantic, and a large number of 
fast German merchant ships had taken refuge in United States ports. 
While the navy established a watch off of us ports, the gunners on 
Partridge Island stood poised to defend Saint John.7
In fact, the 4.7-inch battery defending Saint John was a sham, 
and the gunners knew it. The wheeled carriages of the guns could not 
be levered about readily enough to track and engage a moving ship. A 
proper coast gun sat on a perfectly balanced carriage on a heavy steel 
pivot set in concrete so the gun could swing rapidly and precisely on 
a wide arc. As the battery commander complained early in 1915: “I 
find myself . with orders to fire on a hostile vessel and with such 
material on hand that the result would be to aggravate the situation 
rather than better it.”8
5 Ibid., 1.
6 Ibid., 6 August 1914, 10.
7 Michael L. Hadley and Roger Sarty, Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: German Naval 
Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880-1918 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1991), chap. 4.
8 This and the following paragraphs reproduces material quoted in General Staff, 
“Memorandum on the Defence of St. John, N.B.,” 19 October 1936, File HQS 12 
pt 5, LAC, RG 24, Box 2269; on Gwatkin and the formation of policy see Roger 
Sarty, “Silent Sentry: A Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence, 
1860-1945” (PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1983), 257-83, 296-305.
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None of this came as a surprise to General W.G. Gwatkin, the 
highly competent British officer who served as chief of the general 
staff in Ottawa. Gwatkin had agreed to send the 4.7-inch guns to 
Partridge Island during the panic in early August 1914 to “soothe 
the citizens of St. John.” But he resisted all new calls from coastal 
and border towns for defences. It was an uphill struggle as Minister 
of Militia and Defence Colonel Sam Hughes, although no less keen 
than Gwatkin to make the largest possible effort overseas, was also 
extremely sensitive to political pressure. In the case of Partridge 
Island, Gwatkin privately wrote that, “If it rested with me I would 
withdraw the 4.7” guns, as I believe their presence at St. John to be 
unnecessary from a military point of view. But they were mounted 
for other than military purposes, and I am powerless.”9
In fact, many of the members of the regiment who came out for 
active service on Partridge Island had little interest in standing watch 
for German sea raiders. They had joined the Composite Battery in 
the hopes of a chance for service overseas, and soon there was good 
news. On 14 August regimental orders announced that authority 
had been received to raise a “Foreign Service Battery” that would 
form part of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Major Frank Magee 
took charge of the new unit, and was replaced as commander of the 
Composite Battery by Major W.H. “Harry” Harrison. Four of the 
six other officers who had come out with Composite Battery also 
transferred to the overseas unit, and were replaced by four officers 
from the regiment.10 Lieutenant-Colonel Armstrong’s regimental staff 
attended to recruiting, both for the overseas unit and replacements for 
the men who transferred from the Composite Battery. The recruiting 
efforts were vigorous and wide-ranging, with an officer coming from 
the directorate of artillery in Ottawa to help the regiment. Sergeant- 
Major E.M. “Ned” Slader recalled a recruiting mission with Captain 
Ralph Hayes to Minto, some 160 kilometres from Saint John. “We 
brought back a mixed bag, mostly Belgians and Russians. All proved 
good soldiers. I recall particularly Christopher Rudic, a Cossack. He
9 Quoted in “Memorandum on the Defence of St. John, N.B.,” 19 October 1936.
10 Regimental orders, 14 August 1914; “Pay-List of the Officers of the Composite 
Battery....,” August 1914, August 1914-February 1915 file, LAC, RG 9IIA9, Box 928.
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 26
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss1/26
W I N D S O R  & S A R T Y :  109
Canadian Field A rtillery  recruiting poster. 
[War Records Survey Posters / Library and 
Archives Canada. R1 1 8 5 -6 7 -0 -E, Box A 1 5 2 ]
had been a Cavalry Sergeant in the Russo-Japanese War, a superb 
horseman and later in the war Colonel Penhale’s groom.”11
By the end of August the overseas battery, composed of 
five officers and 254 other ranks, was ready to leave. It included 
Lieutenants William “Bill” Vassie, Lawrence Kelly, and Ralph 
Hayes, a number of long-time noncommissioned members of the 
regiment like Ned Slader, Charlie Cunard, Ed Puddy, A.E. Locket, 
Jim Stackhouse, Jack Edwards, and Alfred Dodge, and a few new 
volunteers. The battery marched to Union Station in Saint John on 
28 August, led by Major Magee through a crowd of well-wishers. 
Grey skies threatened rain, but they could not dampen the public’s 
enthusiasm. Slader remembered “Crowds cheering, flags flying, the 
Artillery Band directed by Bandmaster Charlie Williams playing 
Our Director march. I admit I was somewhat exhilarated.”12 Pouring 
rain greeted the train with the Saint John Battery aboard as it slid 
to a halt in Moncton to load the 19th Field Battery led by Major S. 
Boyd Anderson and Sergeant-Major Ernie Whitebone. The Moncton
11 E.M. Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space Age: Collections of the New 
Brunswick Historical Society (Saint John: Lingley Printing Company, 1973), 52.
12 Ibid., 50-55.
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gunners brought along a Westmoreland County black bear cub named 
“Lee,” apparently not the only unit travelling with such a mascot.13
Rain fell hard all the way to Valcartier, Quebec, where the 
first contingent was mustering under canvas and the new camp 
rose around them. In the earliest days of Sam Hughes’ Valcartier 
camp, shelter was scarce and food even more so. Stories of camp 
confusion, shortage and deprivation are legion. Less well known 
and perhaps more remarkable is how quickly militia trained officers 
and non-commissioned officers (ncos), along with the Permanent 
Force personnel, pulled things together. Saint John’s Regimental 
Quartermaster Sergeant Charlie Cunard, a South African War 
veteran, scrounged bedding and ground sheets. The 3rd Regiment’s 
Lieutenant Cyrus Inches was waiting in Valcartier for the New 
Brunswickers to arrive. Inches had arrived early to link up with 
their new commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel John Penhale from 
Sherbrooke, Quebec. A  Permanent Force regimental sergeant-major 
(rsm) was appointed too: Jim Slade. “A veteran of the Northwest 
Rebellion and the South African War, a warrant officer of long 
standing in the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, he was an expert 
in what is known in the army as ‘Man Management’.” Shelter and 
rations were sorted quickly so that organisation of the divisional 
artillery and training could commence.14
If the misery of Valcartier was not enough, the men of the 3rd 
Regiment’s Overseas Battery soon learned that their skills at long 
range gunnery were not required. Instead, Major Magee and most of 
his men were remustered as Number 4 Section, 1st Canadian Division 
Ammunition Column alongside other sections from Charlottetown 
and Montreal. Their “armament” was now the General Service 
Wagon and their mission was to haul shells to feed the division’s 
hungry guns. Major Anderson’s 19th Moncton Battery disappeared, 
too. It was combined with a section from Sydney, Nova Scotia’s 
17th Battery to form 6th Field Battery, equipped with six modern 
18-pounder field guns. The new 6th Field Battery joined batteries 
from Montreal and Sherbrooke, Quebec to form 2nd Canadian Field 
Brigade. The Montreal field gunners were led by a young Major 
Andrew McNaughton.
13 “Mascots of Moncton Battery are Talk of Battery Lines,” Moncton Times, 4 
September 1914, 5.
14 Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space Age, 56-67 (p. 57 quoted).
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The 2nd Field Brigade’s structure was not to last, but its eastern 
Canadian flavour would. And Saint John gunners gradually assumed 
an increasingly prominent role in Canada’s heavy artillery. That 
started in late September 1914 when Major Magee was transferred 
to command 1st Canadian Heavy Battery. The “1st Heavies” served 
four modern breech-loading 60-pounder heavy field guns making 
them the most powerful artillery unit in the Canadian Division. The 
battery was initially assembled from the Montreal Heavy Brigade, 
but was liberally reinforced by the 3rd New Brunswick Regiment 
officers and men who followed Magee, bringing their 4.7-inch heavy 
gun experience with them. The partnership was the first of many 
links forged between New Brunswick and Montreal gunners.15
Barely thirty days after arriving at Valcartier Camp the first 
contingent was equipped and organised into all the necessary parts 
required for 1st Canadian Division and ready for their passage to 
Great Britain. The artillerymen and their horses with wagons, guns, 
ammunition, and other equipment marched to the Quebec City 
docks late in September to load aboard the ss Megantic and the ss 
Montezuma. “The men, who expected to sleep in hammocks, are in 
the L and third-class staterooms, much better accommodation than 
most of them had ever enjoyed before.”16 Regimental Sergeant-Major 
Slade and Sergeant-Major Slader had a state room all to themselves 
“provided with luxurious beds complete with silken covers and electric 
heaters to be turned on and off at our pleasure,”17 in stark contrast 
to the conditions they were soon to encounter. They set sail down 
the St. Lawrence River on 1 October. Two days later they joined the 
convoy carrying the whole Canadian force in the Gaspe Basin and set 
out into the open Atlantic. With them went virtually all of Canada’s 
modern equipment. The fact that 1st Division was mobilised, 
equipped, and dispatched so quickly challenges conventional wisdom 
that Canada entered the war ill-prepared. More training in England
15 Valerie Teed, ed., Uncle Cy’s War: The First World War Letters of Major 
Cyrus F. Inches (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2009), 21-22; Slader, From the 
Victorian Era to the Space Age, 60.
16 Cyrus Inches letter 27 September 1914 in Teed, Uncle Cy’s War, 23.
17 Slader, 60.
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SS Megantic. [Library and Archives Canada PA 0 2 1 5 0 6 ]
lay ahead, but nothing could have prepared them for the rigours of 
war that awaited them.18
The convoy arrived at Plymouth after eleven days at sea, and 
then the troops encamped on West Down North, in the British 
Arm y’s field training area on the Salisbury Plain. Lieutenant Cyrus 
Inches became the next 3rd New Brunswick Regiment officer to be 
transferred to Major Magee’s 1st Heavy Battery. Here was a further 
recognition that the skills acquired in the pre-war coastal defence and 
fortress roles— long-range, indirect fire— were equally valuable for the 
heavy artillery in the field. Magee and Inches served together in the 
militia and Inches wrote home that he was glad for the assignment. “I 
think I can work in better with Frank than any other— he appreciates 
my capacities and incapacities better.”19 Both officers were destined 
to accomplish great things before the war was over. That autumn, 
1st Heavy Battery’s New Brunswick flavour increased as more 
experienced Saint John gunners transferred in. Among them was 
Gunner Frank Hall, assigned as Inches’ batman. Those officers and
18 For more on the debate over early war Canadian preparedness see Andrew Iarocci, 
Shoestring Soldiers: 1st Canadian Division at War 1914-15 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008); James Wood, Militia Myths, Ideas of the Canadian Citizen 
Soldier, 1896-1921 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
19 Cyrus Inches letter 26 October 1914 in Teed, Uncle Cy’s War, 36.
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men formed the nucleus that later grew and led the Canadian Corps 
Heavy Artillery.
Those developments lay far off in the future. First, the gunners 
faced an unusually wet fall and winter on the Salisbury Plain. The 
rain began days after their arrival. By 2 November it had rained 
for ten days straight. Lieutenant Inches wrote home that the locals 
warned that all “indications were not for better weather.” Wet days 
carried through to December when Gunner John Bovard wrote home 
to Moncton to report, “there hasn’t been 12 hours of fine weather 
day or night since we have been here. I was on guard duty last 
night and it rained as hard as I ’ve ever seen it rain ... the water 
was about 3 inches deep in the guard tent. Imagine sleeping in that 
with nothing but blankets over you.” Sergeant Noah Steeves wrote 
his sister that packages from home helped fend off the unending 
dampness. “The Daughters of the Empire at Moncton sent socks, 
sleeping caps, housewives (darning kits) handkerchiefs, and I got my 
share of them.”20
During that miserable winter the Moncton gunners received 
orders to re-establish their own battery. The whole 2nd Field Brigade 
re-organised from three six-gun batteries to four four-gun batteries 
to conform to the new British standard designed to spread the 
limited number of field guns evenly across the rapidly expanding 
army. The 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery nevertheless retained all 
its guns and gunners. New British divisions included thirty-six field 
guns in nine batteries, while the Canadians kept fifty-two guns now 
spread across thirteen batteries.21 One of the “new” batteries was 
the 8th, formerly the 19th, Moncton Battery under their old battery 
commander, Major Boyd Anderson. It was under this new number 
they would make history. In those days, “Anderson’s Battery” was 
a happy lot, still holding onto their mascot “Lee.” Gunner George 
McMullen wrote home that “the bear is as fat as a pig. We have him 
in a tent in a box and he wanders around all day.”22 Conditions on 
Salisbury Plain made it difficult to train. Thankfully, by January 
1915, Magee’s 1st Heavy Battery, Ned Slader’s Number 4 Section
20 Cyrus Inches letter, 2 November 1914 in Teed, Uncle Cy’s War, 38; “Letter home 
from Gnr T. J. Bovard,” Moncton Times, 1 December 1914, 7; 15 December 1914, 
“Letter from Sgt. N. Steeves,” ibid., 15 December 1915, 6.
21 Martin Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: The Western Front, 
1914-1918 (Woolwich, UK: The Royal Artillery Institution, 1986) 82-86.
22 “Letter from George McMullen,” Moncton Times, 9 December 1914, 7.
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of the Divisional Ammunition Column, and Anderson’s 8th Battery 
moved into billets in nearby villages. Leave passes became available 
to London and other nearby destinations thereby improving morale.23
T H E  S E C O N D  C O N T I N G E N T , A N D  O T H E R  N E W  C O M M I T M E N T S
By early 1915 more New Brunswick gunners were on their way to 
Salisbury Plain. Before 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery completed 
its training in England, it was already clear that the war would last 
some time. Canada responded by assembling a second division for 
service overseas. New Brunswickers not able to secure posts in the 
first contingent were now asked for three more units. The 3rd New 
Brunswick Regiment recruited the Headquarters and 1st Section of 
2nd Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column under the command 
of Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. “Harry” Harrison. The total strength 
of the 2nd Divisional Ammunition Column was 852 all ranks. 
Of these, some 158 are shown on the sailing list as having been 
recruited at Saint John and Fredericton, of which about seventy 
show previous service with the 3rd Regiment, including eleven of 
the nineteen officers.24 Twenty of the 217 officers and men of the 
2nd Canadian Heavy Battery, primarily a Charlottetown unit, were 
New Brunswick gunners. Meanwhile, militia field battery depots in 
Fredericton, Moncton, Woodstock, and Chatham recruited for 23rd 
and 24th Field Batteries which included officers and men from all 
over the Maritimes. Among others, the 3rd New Brunswick Regiment 
contributed the experienced Battery Sergeant-Major Holly Patchell 
to stiffen the force.
Mobilisation of men for the second contingent left the Composite 
Battery on Partridge Island, now under the command of Captain 
J.E. Sayre, seriously under strength. O f the seventy-nine gunners on 
the island at the end of January 1915, thirty-one had joined just that 
month.25 In fact, the demands on the regiment had just begun. Early
23 Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space Age, 64.
24 H.C. Clark, Extracts from the War Diary and Official Records of the Second 
Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column (Saint John, NB: J and A McMillan, 
1921), 5-9; “2nd Divisional Ammunition Column. Nominal RolL.Embarkation...,” 
available at http://eco.canadiana.ca; Composite Battery Daily Orders, 10 December 
1914, August 1914-February 1915 file, LAC, RG 9 IIF9, Box 928.
25 Pay-list Composite Battery other ranks for January 1915, ibid.
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in March, 6th Division in Halifax directed the 3rd Regiment and 
the pei Heavy Brigade each to provide a detachment of seventy-five 
personnel for duty in the Halifax forts. The garrison was proving too 
small to keep the coastal batteries adequately crewed for what would 
now apparently be a long war. Rear-Admiral R.S. Phipps Hornby, 
commander of the Royal Navy cruisers operating from Halifax, would 
not consider a reduction in the defences; the existing level was essential 
to the security of his warships. Regimental orders announcing the 
organisation of the detachment required all other ranks not already 
on duty on Partridge Island or enlisted in the new cef contingent to 
report to the island or the armouries within forty-eight hours. The 
orders applied the whip, which certainly reflected the urgent need 
for reinforcements at Halifax, and might also have shown awareness 
that personnel did not relish the prospect of prolonged, unglamourous 
home service.
All NCO’s and men who receive notices and do not report as above will 
be considered as having no objection to going on active service in home 
defence and will be called out. Of those that report, those making no 
objection will be called out first and the balance of the required number 
will be made up first form the single men and those from the married 
men who will suffer least financially.26
A detachment comprised of Captain Lawrence T. Allen, Lieutenant 
H.A. Bruce, Lieutenant Herb A. West and seventy-two other ranks left 
Saint John by train to Halifax on 16 March 1915, and immediately on 
their arrival took up duties in the coastal defence batteries. A  second 
detachment, Lieutenant Colin MacKay and fifteen gunners, entrained 
for Halifax on 20 March. They joined a new unit, Number 6 Company, 
Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery (rcga), created in response to a 
request from the British government for a garrison to protect Port 
Casties, St. Lucia in the Windward Islands of the Caribbean. By early 
1915 it seemed clear that the role of Regimental Headquarters and the 
Composite Battery stuck on Partridge Island was to recruit and train 
gunners for others to employ.
26 Regimental orders, 8 March 1915.
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T O  F R A N C E
During that bleak winter on Salisbury Plain, batteries and ammunition 
columns practiced gun drill in the field for attack and defence as well 
as methods for staging ammunition supplies for a sustained action. 
All ammunition column members— men and horses— trained to serve 
the guns, as they were to be ready quickly to replace and casualties 
in the batteries. Battery commanders and staff practiced telephone 
and other forms of communication with brigade headquarters and 
with forward observation officers (foos). Royal Artillery instructors 
emphasized selection and preparation of covered and concealed firing 
positions and ammunition dumps as well as hitching up guns and 
wagons in darkness for crash moves in and out of positions. These 
lessons of the South African War were reinforced by experience in 
France which proved that guns must be dug in and dispersed in 
depth behind the front line infantry and connected to observers at 
the front with clear lines of vision and good communications to 
the guns behind them.27 Training in England culminated in January 
1915 with live practice firing from covered positions and correcting 
fire based on reports from forward observers.28 According to the 
Moncton Times, Anderson’s 8th Battery “made the highest record of 
any Canadian battery or any of the batteries of Kitchener’s army.”29 
New Brunswick’s first three artillery units depended entirely on 
horses to move guns and wagons. Officers and men alike therefore 
invested considerable time caring for horses, saddlery and vehicles 
after a day of dragging all through the mud. When the units moved 
into billets in January 1915, the animals could finally be stabled 
and sheltered from the cold steady barrage of rain. Most horses were 
brought all the way from Canada, but those of 1st Heavy Battery 
proved too light to haul the 60-pounder guns, each weighing some five- 
and-a-half tons. Most were replaced with draught teams, although a 
few Canadian horses stayed within the battery to haul ammunition 
wagons and for other tasks.30
27 Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 51.
28 War Diary (WD) 2nd Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery (2 Cdn Fd Bde), 
October-December 1914, January 1915, LAC, RG 9 IIID3, Box 4964.
29 Moncton Times, 9 February 1915, 8.
30 C.F. Inches, 1st Canadian Heavy Battery in France: Farwell Message to the 
NCOs and Men (Liverpool: C. Tinling & Co., 1919), 23.
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On 4 February 1915, days before the Canadians were set to sail for 
France, Germany declared a naval blockade of Great Britain, which 
diverted the Canadian convoy from La Havre to St. Nazaire. Rough 
seas threw two 1st Heavy Battery horses to the deck, breaking bones 
and forcing broken hearted drivers to shoot them and throw them 
over the side. At St. Nazaire in the Brittany peninsula they boarded 
trains emblazoned with the now infamous stencil “40 Hommes, 8 
Chevaux” and set off on a two day journey across Normandy, the 
Somme and finally to Hazebrouck in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region 
of France, close to the Belgian border and the front line.31“To the east 
we could see [V]ery lights and flashes and hear the steady rumble of 
the guns.”32
On arrival, the entire Canadian Divisional Artillery, under 
command of Colonel Henry Burstall, ran through exercise rides to re­
condition horses after long days of cramped travelling. Most batteries’ 
personnel went forward to a British host unit to get a taste of the 
front. Anderson’s 8th Battery shadowed a British 18-pounder brigade 
at Le Bizet on the north edge of Armentieres. While officers went 
forward to observation posts, gunners worked with the guns “doing the 
same duties and learning all possible from the experienced soldiers.” 
They were especially impressed by efforts to conceal gun pits from 
German aircraft. Frank Magee went forward with a Royal Garrison 
Artillery 60-pounder battery dug in behind Armentieres. The 1st 
Divisional Ammunition Column officers moved to Meteren on the 
main highway and railway link connecting Dunkirk to Armentieres 
to see how 4th British Division ran its ammunition supply.33 While 
first tastes of active service alongside British units proved rewarding, 
it took something else to get used to local farms which served as 
ammunition dumps, gun positions, and homes for men and horses. 
Lieutenant Inches wrote “French Farmers put Godliness first and 
cleanliness last with a vengeance. The filth about the barnyards is 
nauseating.” Sergeant-Major Slader felt no better about the farm 
assigned as home to the New Brunswick section of the Ammunition 
Column. It was “filthy and stunk to high heaven.... One night in the
31 WD, 1st Canadian Heavy Battery (1 CHB), February 1915, LAC, RG 9 IIID3, 
Box 4977.
32 Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space Age, 71.
33 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde and 1 CHB, February 1915; WD 1st Canadian Divisional 
Ammunition Column (1 CDAC), February 1915, LAC, RG 9 IIID3, Box 4977.
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barn was sufficient time to louse up the whole outfit.” So began the 
gunners’ battle with the skin-irritating insects that lasted longer than 
the war with Germany.34
Canadian gunners’ introduction to the Western Front coincided 
with preparations for a minor British offensive that demonstrated just 
how hard it was to master this new kind of warfare. At the end of 
February, 1st Canadian Division and all its guns moved a few miles 
south to relieve 7th British Division around Sailly-sur-la-Lys. Their 
new positions, facing Aubers Ridge, was just north of British and 
Indian divisions preparing to attack Neuve Chapelle. On 1 March, 
1st Canadian Heavy Battery rolled their 60-pounders into positions 
vacated by two British 4.7-inch gun batteries in an orchard at Pont 
Vanuxeem, north of Sailly. Major Magee had the men conceal the 
guns among the orchard’s hedges and under the branch canopy. In 
early 1915 the war was still too new for shells to have laid waste 
to everything above ground. Among the hedges and fruit trees 1st 
Heavy Battery signallers ran telephone lines from gun positions back 
to Magee’s battery headquarters and forward to an observation post. 
The low, flat, wet country around Sailly and the River Lys made 
artillery observing the fall of shot difficult, but stone churches and 
larger buildings in Aubers, Fromelles, and le Maisnil were visible atop 
Aubers Ridge offering points of reference. Fromelles’ church tower 
still stood proudly atop the German-held ridge.
The next morning, 2 March 1915, Magee’s battery fired the first 
Canadian rounds of the Great War. It began with registration shoots, 
followed by counter-battery fire with 60-pounder shrapnel shells 
bursting over two German battery positions. They also burst shrapnel 
around the Fromelles church tower to force German artillery observers 
to take cover. Lyddite and high explosive shells with contact fuses 
would have been more effective but were in short supply in these early 
days of war. Much of what was available was being dumped at British 
gun pits closer to the centre of the coming storm at Neuve Chapelle.
The same day, 2 March, Moncton’s 8th Battery arrived at the 
divisional headquarters area at Sailly with the rest of 2nd Field 
Brigade. There they waited for darkness to conceal their move 
over the River Lys and into positions at Barlette Farm just west 
of Fleurbaix, 2500 yards behind the British frontline trench system
34 Teed, Letter 27 February 1915, 62; Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space 
Age, 71.
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facing Fromelles and le Maisnil. When daylight had gone, drivers and 
teams pulled 18-pounder guns and ammunition limbers quickly into 
positions taken over from a Royal Horse Artillery brigade. The 8th 
Battery formed the reserve. Major Anderson left one two-gun section 
on the north side of the Lys and moved the other section in depth, 
behind 5th, 6th and 7th Batteries at Barlette Farm. On 3 March 
the sun was hidden by threatening grey clouds, but once it was light 
enough to observe the fall of shot, the forward batteries registered 
on known aiming points on the enemy front, and moved horses and 
wagons to the rear at Sailly. For the next week their trench routine 
consisted of firing small numbers of shrapnel rounds to burst over 
enemy trenches and occasionally at houses and farm buildings from 
which the infantry reported German snipers. Much to the field gunners’ 
frustration if not surprise, air burst shrapnel shells had little effect on 
German snipers in brick houses except to make them duck, but the 
18-pounder high explosive shells needed to smash buildings were in even 
shorter supply than for the heavies. Overall, 2nd Brigade and 1st Heavy 
Battery did not fire much in that week. Still, the dozen or so shells 
each battery fired per day tested gun sights, telephone connections to 
their forward observation posts, and skills at setting fuses to burst over 
enemy trenches. On 7 March, 1st Heavy Battery’s 60-pounders finally 
blew down the Fromelles Church Tower. Lieutenant Inches wrote later 
that the tower was a known “enemy observation post which dominated 
the whole divisional front. ... The battery was brought into prominence 
almost immediately by its destruction.”35
The Battle for Neuve Chapelle was set to open on the morning 
of 10 March 1915, when six British and Indian divisions would 
attack two German divisions. The Canadian mission was to convince 
German commanders that the attack frontage extended north to 
Fleurbaix and thus encourage them to disperse their artillery fire 
and reserve troops. At 7:30 a.m., all of 2nd Field Brigade’s batteries 
(except the 8th, still in reserve) opened fire along with riflemen and 
machine-gunners from Canadian infantry battalions facing Aubers 
Ridge. Anderson’s men had to watch as their brigade fired their 
biggest shoot of the war so far— 437 shells. The 1st Heavy Battery 
shelled Aubers village itself and suspected enemy gun positions in the 
woods east of Fromelles, all as part of the general Canadian deception 
effort. The main British attack at Neuve Chapelle saw the largest
35 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde and 1 CHB, March 1915; Teed, Uncle Cy’s War, 59.
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British artillery barrage of the war so far, employing sixty-six heavy 
guns and hundreds of 18-pounder field guns.36 The principle was 
sound, but in reality, the number of guns and supply of ammunition 
available were too small to accomplish the goal.
The small Canadian diversionary barrage at Aubers nonetheless 
incited German artillery to retaliate commencing a seventy-two hour 
low-level gunnery duel. Each of three mornings Canadian batteries 
fired small dummy barrages of ten to fifteen rounds per gun. German 
guns fired similar numbers back and more, including high explosive 
shells fired by their very effective medium 5.9-inch howitzers. The 1st 
Heavy Battery answered the German field and heavy guns as best 
they could, but four 60-pounders and the pitiful stocks of ammunition 
could not begin to silence enemy guns. Each of three mornings, 2nd 
Field Brigade’s forward observers counted fewer German kitchen 
wagon fires to their front as enemy infantry thinned and shifted 
south to seal off the initial British gains at Neuve Chapelle. While 
the Germans thinned their infantry, they kept their grip on Aubers 
Ridge with artillery fire. Magee’s 60-pounders tried to prevent their 
movement. On 15 March they ranged in on a train loading and 
unloading German men and equipment at Fromelles Station, hitting 
three cars and the locomotive pulling them.
The Battle of Neuve Chapelle ended by 15 March 1915. Only then 
did the 8th Field Battery come forward for their turn to range in, 
but by then daily ammunition quantities were used up. The Germans 
continued their retaliation. They aggressively pushed a 77 mm field 
battery into their trench line, close to new construction on a front 
line redoubt or strong point. In the spirit of medieval siege warfare, 
the 2nd Field Brigade burst shrapnel rounds over the new German 
redoubt to slow the work. On 16 March, the 2nd Field’s 18-pounders 
joined their efforts with 1st Heavies to destroy the redoubt. They 
massed as much 60-pounder and 18-pounder shrapnel fire as was 
available on Germans who appeared to be rushing their work on the 
new positions. Frank Magee felt that the shoot “destroyed enemy 
gun emplacement in trench.”37 According to Colonel Burstall’s
36 G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment 
of Canadian Artillery, Volume I: 1534-1919 (Toronto and Montreal: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1967), 212-213.
37 WD 1 CHB, 16 March 1915.
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headquarters, the bombardment “inflicted serious damage.”38 The 
Germans responded to the Canadian barrage the next day with a 
concentration of 5.9-inch howitzer high explosive shells fired deep into 
the Canadian divisional rear, smashing apart houses uses as billets 
for Canadian infantry units. The mixture of good shooting and good 
luck was not enough to respond to superior German firepower. This 
first real taste of war cost the Canadian Divisional Artillery no losses 
in men or guns, but offered a glimpse of what lay ahead until the 
Allies deployed enough heavy artillery to match German firepower 
and until Allied factories could turn out more heavy guns and shells 
to equip them.
38 WD 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery Headquarters, 17 March 1915, LAC, RG 
9 IIID3, Box 4958.
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T H E  S E C O N D  B A T T L E  O F  Y P R E S
On 1 April 1915 all of the 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery came 
out of the line and into reserve behind the Aubers Ridge Front. 
Easter Sunday fell on 4 April that year and provided the occasion 
to parade all batteries in the division, including the Divisional 
Ammunition Column and 1st Heavy Battery. It was the last time 
they served directly together for nearly two years. Senior British 
commanders recognised the need to concentrate heavy guns at the 
point of main effort. The 1st Canadian Heavy Battery was thus 
detached from the division and pooled with what in 1915 were very 
limited numbers of the latest heavy and siege guns massing in the 
Aubers Ridge sector. When the Canadian divisional artillery received 
orders to head northeast to the Ypres Salient, the 1st Heavy Battery 
remained facing Aubers. There the British Expeditionary Force 
massed all available 60-pounders and newer-model medium and 
heavy howitzers available as part of its attack to support the French 
spring offensive further south in the Artois and Champagne regions. 
The British decision to assist the French attack was and still remains 
controversial. Some participants and historians criticise General 
Joffre’s decision to attack the well dug-in German Army in early 
1915 with not nearly enough heavy guns or ammunition to achieve 
any advantage. Others recognise that German occupation of most 
of the great northern coalfields around Lille and Douai along with 
France’s most important railway network threatened the nation’s 
survival and gave French leaders little choice but to attack German 
forces and begin the process of evicting the aggressor from their 
soil. Historian and Royal Artillery veteran Dominick Graham wrote 
that under such circumstances that the British and their dominions 
“could not stand on the defensive while her allies bled to death.”39
39 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons 
and Theories of War 1904-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 70 
(quoted); Great Britain, Admiralty, France: Volume IV, Ports and Communications, 
Geographical Handbook Series, 70BR 503 C (London: Naval Intelligence Division, 
1942), 252-260. For a discussion of the historical debate and global strategic issues 
of 1915 see G.W.L Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Official 
History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1962), 46-50; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 194-200; William Philpott, Three Armies 
on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2010), 72-75.
21
and : New Brunswick’s Artillery Goes to War, 1914-1915
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
124 : New Brunswick’s Artillery Goes to War
The 1st Canadian Division and its remaining field artillery 
contributed to the French effort by freeing a French division 
manning the Ypres salient for service in the main spring offensive. 
The decision set the stage for the first Canadian battles of the Great 
War. Accounts of the now famous story of the Second Battle of Ypres 
are understandably dominated by infantry units from central and 
western Canada. Because New Brunswickers in the first contingent 
were mostly gunners, their story lays hidden in the shadows. What 
follows is the first attempt to record their experience.
The 1st Canadian Divisional Ammunition Column were the first 
gunners into the infamous sector on 13 April, setting up an ammunition 
depot and replenishment network based at Vlamertinge, two miles 
west of Ypres. From there they fed .303 small arms ammunition 
and grenades to Canada’s three infantry brigades. The 2nd Field 
Brigade’s advance party arrived on 16 April to meet their French 
artillery counterparts whom they were about to relieve near Wieltje, 
2500 yards northeast of Ypres. The 5th and 8th Batteries followed 
the next day. The Moncton battery’s four sub-sections prepared gun 
pits on the front right of the brigade area in a farm a few hundred 
yards south of Fortuin and shielded behind the crest of Zonnebeke 
Ridge— a spur off the main sandy Messines-Passchendaele Ridge that 
dominated the Ypres salient. The area was badly scarred in places 
during the First Battle for Ypres in late 1914, but not yet turned to 
the moonscape associated with later battles. When the sun came up 
on 18 April, Major Anderson’s battery found two houses still standing 
behind German front line trenches on which they could register their 
fire. The next day, when German 77 mm “whizz bang” field guns 
shelled 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade’s front line trenches in front 
of Gravenstaffel Ridge, the 8th Battery fired in retaliation.
Overall, those first days in the Salient were quiet— deceptively 
so in view of the storm building behind German lines. Such was 
the apparent lack of activity on 21 April that Burstall, now a 
brigadier, ordered practice reliefs-in-place between the 2nd and 3rd 
Field Brigades deployed behind the front line and 1st Brigade held in 
reserve at Ypres. Reliefs began by half batteries that night. The 8th 
Battery’s Right Section relieved a section from Hamilton, Ontario’s 
11th Battery in the northern or left section of Canada’s front near St. 
Julien. Anderson’s 8th Battery Headquarters and Left Section were 
joined behind Zonnebeke Ridge by a section from 3rd “Gananoque”
22
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Battery.40 This small detail matters immensely because the storm 
about to break foiled the second half of the relief. For the next 
week, the Moncton battery remained divided, one two-gun section 
and battery headquarters with their parent 2nd Field Brigade and 
the other section with 3rd Field Brigade. The 8th Battery gunners 
therefore served nearly everywhere on the Second Ypres battlefield. So 
too did Battery Sergeant-Major Slader’s New Brunswick 4th Section 
of the Divisional Ammunition Column. True to the artillery motto 
“Ubique,” New Brunswick gunners were everywhere in what became 
known as the Second Battle of Ypres.
On the afternoon of 22 April 1915 General Alderson and Brigadier 
Burstall were in the gun line behind Gravenstaffel ridge when 
French rifle fire drew their attention north, and to “the two clouds 
of yellowish-green smoke each of which expanded until they blended 
into a single body.”41 This cloud of chlorine gas choked French and 
Algerian soldiers to death and virtually collapsed the northern rim of 
the Ypres salient. Then the guns started. The Germans had massed 
field and heavy artillery pieces of six divisions, reinforced with 147 
heavy guns and howitzers in calibres up to 170 mm,42 behind their 
front, and struck the French with crushing fire. High explosive shells 
caved in trenches, blew apart strong points, buried or obliterated men, 
and silenced French artillery batteries. The German intent to capture 
Ypres was part of wider plans to disrupt and block French attacks on 
the Western Front that might interfere with their massive offensive 
in Poland designed to “annihilate the offensive power of Russia for 
all time.”43 The Allies were compelled to hold Ypres at all costs. 
It served as “a physical and a moral bastion of resistance against 
German occupation of the small corner of free Belgian territory.”44 
Ypres was a symbol to Great Britain and to Canada of the very 
reasons why they went to war.
The assault at Ypres opened three dramatic days in which 
Canadians won lasting fame at a hideous cost. Between 22 and 25 
April, the 1st Canadian Division of roughly 18,000 men sustained
40 Major Crerar was a Permanent Force gunner who rose to command First 
Canadian Army during the Second World War. WD 1 CDAC and 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 
13-21 April 1915.
41 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 101.
42 Nicholson, Gunners, 223.
43 Nicholson, CEF, 59.
44 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 5.
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over 6,000 casualties, 2,000 of them dead. Vastly outnumbered in 
men, weapons and artillery, and beset by chlorine gas, in the end 
Canadian willpower and skill-at-arms checked German attempts to 
capture Ypres and wipe out the salient. Afterwards, the British War 
Office announced: “The Canadians had many casualties but their 
gallantry and determination undoubtedly saved the situation.”45
Canadian gunners are less well known for their exploits at the 
Second Battle of Ypres. The most famous of them are Major William 
King’s 10th Field Battery from St. Catharine’s, Ontario. It found 
itself north of St. Julien in a sharp corner in the new front line 
formed after 45th Algerian Division collapsed. The St. Catharine’s 
battery fired over open sights, helping to break the German attack 
on the Canadian left flank. But their four guns were not the only 
18-pounders in action during those desperate days. The two sections of 
New Brunswick’s 8th Battery, separated in the disrupted relief begun 
on 21 April, fought in both 2nd and 3rd Field Brigade areas. These 
brigades were connected by field telephones to forward observation 
officers on Gravenstaffel Ridge, who could see well to the northeast 
and east, and poorly due north. At 6:00 p.m. 22 April, while the 
St. Catharines gunners poured fire into the advancing Germans, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Creelman’s 2nd Field Brigade telephone exchange 
received calls for fire on enemy troops in the open. “All batteries 
opened up almost immediately.” So, too, did heavy German counter­
battery fire and there was a strong whiff of gas. Moncton Gunner 
Clyde Mollins wrote home afterwards. “In the afternoon the enemy 
attacked; the shells were flying all around us, shrapnel hitting the 
building. This kept up all afternoon and they were using those gas 
shells. They were awful; we were all going around with sore eyes and 
half-asleep. About 6:00 p.m. they broke through our lines and our 
infantry (Canadians) had to fight. The enemy was so close to us that 
enemy rifle bullets were hitting the barn we were in, and one of them 
got George McDougall.”46 McDougall was New Brunswick’s first fatal 
gunner casualty of the Great War.
In two hours 2nd Field Brigade fired 645 shrapnel shells in 
response to observer calls. Their shells burst in the air, hurling 
lead balls down onto the closely packed ranks of German infantry.
45 Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916, 
Volume I (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 165.
46 Gunner Clyde Mollins letter home printed in the Moncton Transcript, 19 May 1915.
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German accounts blame Canadian shellfire for stopping their attack. 
“A medical officer with 234th Reserve Regiment,” historian Andrew 
Iarocci writes, “later reported that many of the casualties in his first- 
aid station were caused by shrapnel fire.”47 Sergeant Neil McKinnon 
wrote home to his father in Scotch Settlement New Brunswick about 
what he called the Battle of Langemarck “That it takes the 8th 
Battery of Moncton to ‘do’ the Germans.”48
For a time only the gunners of 3rd Field Brigade, including 8th 
Battery’s Right Section, held the new northern “front.” Brigadier 
Burstall worried that the forward Canadian batteries might be 
encircled and overrun; the 2nd London Heavy Battery’s four old 4.7- 
inch guns had already fallen into German hands. So he ordered both 
forward artillery brigades to hitch up and withdraw to the prepared 
second line of defence known as the General Headquarters (ghq) 
Line. With 3rd Field Brigade’s lines already burdened by Canadian 
and French gas victims and under heavy artillery, machine gun, and 
even rifle fire, the order made sense. Unfortunately it was not received 
by 8th Battery’s Right Section serving with 3rd Field Brigade. They 
remained in place near St. Julien through the night. They finally got 
word to withdraw in the early morning hours and made it back to the 
new 3rd Field Brigade position at the Chateau in St. Jean.49 They did 
so under duress. Afterwards Corporal Ainsley Hicks of Jolicure New 
Brunswick, was recommended for a gallantry award. “In the face of 
what seemed like certain death, Corporal Hicks saved a battery gun 
and retreated successfully.”50
While Lieutenant-Colonel Creelman abandoned his most exposed 
gun positions, he soon had second thoughts about giving up 2nd 
Field Brigade’s excellent firing position behind Zonnebeke Ridge 1000 
yards south of St. Julien, especially so long as Canadian infantry 
still held trenches in front of Gravenstaffel ridge. As 2nd Brigade 
rode their guns back to Wieltje in a night lit by fires, flares and 
shell bursts, Creelman rode into Ypres to take up the matter directly 
with Brigadier Burstall. Meanwhile, Canadian counter-attacks at 
Kitchener’s Wood stabilised the open northern flank. Those attacks
47 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 111.
48 Letter Printed in Moncton Times, 25 May 1915, 8.
49 WD 3rd Brigade, Canadian Field Artillery (3 Cdn Fd Bde), 11th Battery Report, 
22-23 April 1915, LAC, RG 9 IIID3, Box 4966; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers,117.
50 Moncton Times, 7 July 1915, 1.
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were supported by 3rd Field Brigade with its Moncton section before 
they withdrew. Reports from the northern flank helped Creelman 
convince Burstall that the 2nd Brigade should return to its forward 
positions behind Zonnebeke Ridge.51 And so in the early hours of 23 
April, 2nd Field Brigade limbered-up again, braved enemy shells and 
small arms fire, and redeployed in their old positions before dawn. 
Their determination helped save the day. When the sun came up, 
German infantry were seen massing to attack from the northeast. 
The 6th and 7th Batteries opened fire on the road behind the German 
front while 5th and 8th Batteries raked the German front line trench 
itself. They kept that fire up all day, disrupting German attempts to 
organise an assault.52
The 2nd Brigade’s fire on 23 April was made possible by the 1st 
Divisional Ammunition Column’s efforts the previous night. Orders 
came from Burstall’s headquarters ten minutes after the initial attack 
stalled late on 22 April to “Send up lots of ammunition.” The column 
pushed up 2800 shrapnel shells, 200 Lyddite high explosive rounds for 
118th Royal Field Artillery Brigade’s 4.5-inch howitzers, and 600,000 
rounds of .303 rifle and machine gun ammunition. Supply wagons 
circulated all night long. Two horses were injured by shellfire and one 
wagon smashed.53
The main action on 23 April occurred on the northern rim where 
Canadian, British and French counter-attacks towards Mauser 
Ridge were stopped with bloody results. The problem was that 
Allied artillery had not enough heavy guns or high explosive shells to 
damage the German defenders snug in freshly dug trenches protected 
behind newly laid barbed wire or to respond against German long 
range counter-batteries.54 The 8th Battery’s forward observation 
officer, Lieutenant Harvey Tingley wrote home about his frustration. 
“So far as we know, no heavy artillery supported us. We could not get 
back at the Germans, who were pounding us, for we only had field 
artillery against the German heavy guns.”55 Others, more senior to 
Tingley, came to the same conclusion.
51 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers,n6-11g; Nicholson, Gunners, 225.
52 WD 2nd Cdn Fd Bde, 23 April 1915.
53 WD 1 CDAC, 22 April 1915.
54 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 130-131.
55 Letter printed in Moncton Transcript, 25 May 1915.
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H eavy cann on  dem onstration: 60-pounder guns at Valcartier. [Library and Archives Canada 
R231-1028-5-E]
The worst was yet to come. Early on 24 April the winds blew a 
second German gas cloud directly at the apex of the Canadian front. 
Toronto’s 15th Battalion and Winnipeg’s 8th Battalion took the brunt 
of the gas, and a furious fifteen-minute artillery and mortar barrage 
that followed. Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Lipsett, of the 8th Battalion, 
had anticipated trouble and laid extra telephone lines between the 
front and 2nd Field Brigade’s guns. When German infantry emerged 
from their trenches to follow their gas and barrage, Lipsett called 
down pre-registered fire from Creelman’s guns. Bursting 18-pounder 
shrapnel shells and Winnipeg rifle fire “shredded” the German 
assault. The British Royal Artillery history credits 2nd Field Brigade 
with breaking up “attack after attack at ranges of 3500 yards.” The 
Toronto battalion manning the exposed northeastern apex in the 
Canadian front was less fortunate. Before dawn, 3rd Field Brigade 
was ordered to begin moving back to Ypres, behind the Yser Canal, 
and out of range of the apex.56 Fighting in two directions without 
artillery support while choking on gas forced 15th Battalion survivors 
back towards reserve positions on Gravenstaffel Ridge. The morning’s 
events reinforced what many Canadian soldiers already knew, that 
successful infantry defence depended on good communications,
56 Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 137; Nicholson, CEF, 71-73.
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good vantage points for forward observation officers connected by 
redundant communication links to strong artillery forces with ample 
stocks of ammunition.
At 8:30 a.m. the German attack spread across the northeastern 
apex of the front manned by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. 
The attack was heralded by destructive artillery fire concentrations. 
Medium 5.9-inch and heavy 21 cm German high explosive shells 
literally blew Canadian infantrymen out of their trenches or buried 
them alive. The Germans then stormed forward with three times the 
numbers of the exhausted Canadian defenders. Canadian infantry 
fought on with their infamous Ross Rifles, while gunners of 2nd and 
parts of 3rd Field Brigade turned their guns north and ripped through 
the German battalions attempting to storm St. Julien. The enemy 
assault ground to a bloody halt, at least for a time. Battery Sergeant- 
Major Slader remembered that no one had expected to require so 
much ammunition on what was supposed to be “a relatively quiet 
front. Thanks to good planning and tremendous exertion on the part 
of all concerned the supply was maintained.”57 The night before the 
ammunition column delivered 6900 18-pounder rounds. Ammunition 
drivers also brought up over a million bullets and spare parts for 
worn guns. Most of the newly dumped ammunition was fired by 9:45 
a.m. As the day wore on, 2nd Field Brigade hung on precariously, 
supporting the vicious battle for the commanding strongpoint known 
as Locality “C .” They made their few remaining shells count on 
the target rich front. By mid-afternoon “there appeared no sign 
of reinforcements or chance of getting more ammunition,”58 and so 
beleaguered Canadian forward infantry companies withdrew to a 
shorter, more defensible line anchored on the village of St. Julien.
The Germans’ morning attack on 24 April caught 3rd Field 
Brigade in the process of pulling their guns westward behind Yser. 
Now they were needed up front again to stop the enemy onslaught. 
The 8th Battery’s Right Section, still attached to 3rd Field Brigade, 
had just arrived west of the Yser Canal at noon when they received 
counter-orders to ride back through Ypres and into the salient so 
they could support the beleaguered 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade. 
Captain Harry Crerar, 11th Battery’s second in command, had the 
composite 8th and 11th Battery gallop in fifty yard rushes through
57 Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space Age, 73.
58 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 24 April 1915.
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Ypres as it was ripped apart by German long range heavy artillery. 
“Bodies of dead soldiers and civilians, dead horses and dogs, shattered 
buildings and ripped up roads met the eye on every side,” 11th Battery 
reported later. “High explosive and shrapnel are bursting at erratic 
intervals.”59 The 8th Battery Driver William Curley, from Woodstock, 
wrote that “The city was being shelled in such a desperate shape that 
no living thing could stay there, but we had to advance through there 
to regain our old position. We started through at the dead gallop 
with all our horses and guns, and very few of us expected to get 
through alive. Only one man was lost, but half our horses were killed. 
I have a lovely team and thank goodness they were spared.”60
The 8th Battery’s Right Section made it back to a new position 
behind the ghq Line near Potijze,61 where Lieutenant-Colonel 
Creelman had re-positioned 7th Battery and the main body of 
Anderson’s 8th Battery. They had precious few shells left, although 
a small convoy of three ammunition wagons reached them late in 
the afternoon on 24 April. It was enough to hold the Germans at 
point blank range at St. Julien and cover 5th and 6th Batteries’ 
withdrawal back into 2nd Field Brigade’s new position at Potijze.62 As 
darkness fell Creelman re-organised the 2nd Field Brigade to support 
a pre-dawn British counter-attack around St. Julien planned for the 
morning of 25 April. The 2nd Brigade’s log reported that, frustratingly, 
it was “impossible for foos to observe correctly” in support of the 
hastily planned counter-attack. Nor were there enough heavy guns 
or high explosive ammunition to harm the newly entrenched German 
defenders. The tragic result was predictable. Early that morning the 
British 10th Brigade was cut to ribbons by German machine gun and 
artillery fire.
The 2nd Field Brigade won payback after the sun came up when 
Creelman’s forward observation officers spotted German troops 
massing to attack from St. Julien. At 7:00 a.m., the 2nd Field Brigade 
gunners pumped ten minutes of rapid fire into the German ranks. 
The well-observed fire stopped the German’s morning attack cold. 
The gunners even scrounged twenty rounds of rare 18-pounder high 
explosive ammunition to blow apart a house sheltering a German
59 WD 3 Cdn Fd Bde, 11th Battery Report, 24 April 1915.
60 Letter from Driver William Curley, printed in Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 9 June 1915.
61 Ibid., WD 3 Cdn Fd Bde, 11th Battery Report, 24 April 1915.
62 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 24 April 1915.
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machine gun. Nevertheless, the Germans reformed and pressed 
relentlessly south from St. Julien.63 By late afternoon, when German 
infantry attacked out of Kitchener’s Wood west of St. Julien, the 2nd 
Field Brigade fired everything they had at them, but ammunition 
supplies throughout the Ypres salient were almost gone.64
German long range heavy artillery fire on the other hand, never 
seemed to slacken. Gunner George Patterson of Middle Coverdale 
New Brunswick wrote home that, “for days and nights we were hit by 
shells that would tear holes in the ground six to ten feet deep and ten 
feet in diameter. Motion pictures give but a slight idea of the terrible 
work done by the war machines used in this war. On our lines the air 
is full of bursting shells and here and there a heavier shell striking the 
ground and throwing mud and splinters of steel a distance of 75 yards 
and I will leave it to your own mind when there are many troops 
moving or standing about in the open. But thank providence so far 
I am still alive and unhurt.”65 Two other members of the Moncton 
battery were not so lucky that day. Moncton Gunner Ira Mills wrote 
to his sister “I never thought I would see human flesh cut up as it 
was in that scrap.”66 That day direct hits in the 8th Battery’s lines 
killed Gunners Fred Popow and George Talbot. Talbot was an Irish 
immigrant working in Moncton when the war broke out. All four of 
his brothers had been killed in action in 1914. There was nothing left 
of Popow and Talbot to bury, their names were eventually engraved 
on the Menin Gate in Ypres.
Long range German 150 mm and 170 mm guns penetrated 
deep into the Canadian base areas around Ypres and everywhere 
in between. The enemy had even brought up their gigantic fortress- 
smashing 420 mm siege guns to fire 2000-pound shells into Ypres, 
taking the city apart building by building. The strain of action over 
three intense days of firing told heavily on the Canadian guns. On 
the morning of 25 April, Battery Sergeant-Major Ned Slader of the 
ammunition column brought parts through the maelstrom to 12th 
Battery where two guns were knocked out and two others needed 
overhaul. All four guns were brought back into action that same day. 
Slader wrote, “I was in the saddle almost without rest or sleep for
63 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 25 April 1915; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 166-177.
64 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 25 April 1915.
65 Letter printed in Moncton Transcript, 29 May 1915, 3.
66 Letter printed in Moncton Transcript, 27 May 1915, 7.
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nearly six days checking up with Brigade Ammunition Columns and 
riding up with a haversack full of small parts. It was necessary to 
take to the fields as the roads were being heavily shelled.” Gas and 
enemy shelling also drove Belgian farm families westward. “All roads 
out of Ypres and Vlamertinghe were crowded with refugees, their 
former homes on fire or reduced to rubble.” Vlamertinghe itself was 
under heavy fire when Slader left that morning but seemed quiet on 
his return. “I had just cleared the western end when the Germans 
re-opened fire. One shell struck the Church which was being used as 
a hospital. Right in front of the church was an old woman carrying 
a pack and trudging along the pavement. I looked back and a second 
shell burst on the road. The old woman was no more.”67 No place was 
safe in or behind the Ypres salient and at this point in the war, and 
there was nothing the Canadians could do about it.
The great peril abated somewhat on 26 April. The 1st Canadian 
Division became immediately famous in the empire for standing firm 
in the eye of two gas attacks at Ypres. They gave ground, but never 
broke and in the end they played a central role in thwarting German 
plans. Thus, 26 April marks the end of many Canadian accounts 
of the Second Battle of Ypres. That day, 1st Division’s infantry 
battalions were mostly relieved by British troops after nearly 100 
hours of continuous combat. The Canadian Divisional Artillery, 
however, remained in action for another full week as the Second 
Battle of Ypres dragged on and became more international. New 
Brunswick gunners supported counter-attacks by British, Indian, 
and French units while casualties in men and horses mounted and 
exhaustion and death remained ever present. From 26 April right 
through to 3 May, the Canadian artillery bastion around Potijze 
endured steady German counter-battery bombardment. By 27 April, 
2nd Field Brigade was short three officers, fifty gunners, and eighty 
horses despite drawing men and animals from trained gunners serving 
in the brigade and divisional ammunition columns.68
On 29 April German heavy shells finally found their mark in the 
8th Battery Left Section lines north of Potijze. Battery Sergeant- 
Major Noah Steeves was wounded. He wrote that evening from a 
field hospital about his experience. “I saw one strike fair on a gun of 
a another battery near us and part of the carriage flew [fifty] yards
67 Slader, From the Victorian Era to the Space Age, 73-74.
68 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 27 April 1915.
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C anadian A rtillery  loading an 18-pounder gun. [Library and Archives Canada PA 022712]
and came down fifteen feet from where I stood. The crew on that 
gun was badly cut up, three killed outright and three wounded. The 
Germans are still using the famous Jack Johnson shells [5.9-inch 
shell emitting black smoke]. Don’t ever believe any of the yarns you 
hear or see in the papers about Germany being short of ammunition. 
They have both guns and men and ammunition.” The 2nd Field 
Brigade’s war diary recorded that day that “the enemy are superior 
to us in heavy guns and dominate our position with aeroplanes. We 
have no means of locating their batteries beyond the ridge which the 
enemy holds.”69 One Jack Johnson landed three feet behind Gunner 
Leslie Miller of Newcastle, New Brunswick. Five separate white hot 
shell splinters pierced his hips and the blast sprained his back, but 
Miller survived. Gunners Gorden Turner of Moncton and Fred Gunn 
of Chatham, New Brunswick were bringing up fresh rations to the 
gun positions when the fire came down. The blast tore Turner’s hand 
off. The right side of Fred Gunn’s torso was torn open just below 
his heart. Gunn was a trained machinist and employed by Major 
Anderson as the battery artificer. “He was the greatest help to me, 
could test all the sights, buffer range drum, and kept the guns in the 
best condition.” Boyd Anderson wrote home that the team drivers 
“ran out and brought Fred in and told me he was badly wounded. I
69 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 29 April 1915.
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could not go see him as I had gone through a lot there. On his way to 
the dressing station he told the men not to tell his mother or father 
how badly he was wounded.” Fred Gunn died in a field hospital the 
next day.70 That same day, 8th Battery’s Right Section on the west 
side of Potijze experienced its “heaviest shelling thus far.” Sergeant 
Grant was severely wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Creelman himself 
was evacuated on 29 April with a high fever after too much exposure 
to gas and what he later self-described as shell-shock.71
On 1 May, Canada’s Divisional Artillery got word to retire behind 
the Yser Canal where they could disperse batteries better. Their 
artillery fire base at Potijze had become too exposed to German 
shelling from three sides. Before the move commenced word came 
from the forward Indian and British infantry that the Germans were 
massing for something. The 8th Battery gunners joined a Canadian 
barrage against German forward assembly areas before commencing 
their withdrawal over the canal by sections. The withdrawal was 
half complete at 3:00 a.m. early in the morning of 2 May when the 
Germans released another massive chlorine gas cloud. German guns 
pummelled the Allied trenches and the Potijze artillery position 
with fire where the 2nd Field Brigade still had seven guns in action, 
including 8th Battery’s Left Section. The 2nd Field Brigade gunners 
opened fire on sos targets along the front, bursting shrapnel down 
on the attacking enemy infantry. The weight of German shot cut 
telephone connections to forward observation officers with the 
forward infantry. Signalmen working with the forward observation 
officers then acted as runners to carry target information back to the 
gun line. Quick-thinking British infantry in support trenches waited 
until the wind carried the gas cloud on to them and then charged 
through it to re-occupy the front trench. German attackers following 
the gas cloud were caught between British rifle bullets and Canadian 
shrapnel shell bursts. French 75 mm guns added their weight from 
the northern flank. General Alderson reported that the “attack was 
repulsed with heavy [German] loss in spite of a considerable portion
70 Letter of 29 April from Noah Steeves, Moncton Times, 27 May 1915, 7; “Newcastle 
Man Among the Wounded,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 20 May 1915, 6; “Gnr Dunn 
Died of Wounds,” Daily Gleaner, 17 May 1915, 8; Letter from Major S.B. Anderson 
printed in Moncton Times, 7 July 1915, 6; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers, 162.
71 WD 3 Cdn Fd Bde, 11th Battery Report, 30 April 1915.
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of our front having been incapacitated by gas.” Gunners from all of 
the forward Canadian gun sections were among the gas casualties.72
On the day of this third major German gas attack on 2 May, 
Lieutenant Harvey Tingley and his telephone operator, Signaller 
Joseph Arthur Comeau, manned 8th Battery’s observation post in 
a house south of the main road between St. Jean and Wieltje along 
the crown of St. Jean Ridge. From that commanding location they 
called down 8th Battery’s guns on the northern wing of the German 
attack and their front line trench, 350 yards away from the house. All 
day the German barrage rained down around them, knocking down 
portions of the house they occupied. Tingley wrote afterwards that 
“Sig Comeau and I were sitting in a room in the back of the house 
downstairs. We were sitting close together— so close our elbows were 
touching. It was about 3 o’clock in the afternoon that we were struck. 
A  shell burst through the top of the house, demolishing the roof and 
carrying away a portion of the front of the house.” Tingley’s leg was 
smashed. Comeau, formerly on the staff of the Moncton Times, was 
hit badly in the face and later died in an English hospital.73 Despite 
these losses, the New Brunswick gunners had done their share to stop 
this third German gas attack at Ypres.
On the night of 3-4 May, the Canadian Divisional Artillery 
completed its move to well dispersed positions on the west bank 
of the Yser Canal, near Brielen. Although much better spread out, 
Canadian batteries remained under heavy German counter-battery 
fire.74 The 8th Battery Right Section Sergeant Al Humphrey wrote 
home about the day to Mrs. Fletcher Polleys, mother of Ned Polleys 
of Moncton. Sergeant Humphrey’s crew served their gun under heavy 
German shellfire all day. “At about 4:30pm, several shells came very 
close to our guns and one pitched about ten or fifteen feet away.” 
After some time Ned Polleys called out, “Boys, I ’m not hit, I ’m 
paralyzed.” “He was lifted from the gun seat and placed beside the 
wheel. All medical aid possible was rendered but he passed within 
minutes.” As Humphreys explained to Mrs. Polleys, “The whole
72 WD 2 Cdn Fd Bde, 1-2 May 1915; WD 1st Canadian Divisional Artillery 
Headquarters, 1-3 May 1915; “Operations: 2nd Battle of Ypres (General Alderson’s 
Report),” File 34 pt 1, LAC, RG 9 IIIC3, Box 4017 (quoted).
73 “Another local boy has given life to Empire” Moncton Transcript, 31 May, 8; 
interview with Lieutenant Tingley on his repatriation home, Moncton Times, 27 
July 1915, 5.
74 WD 3 Cdn Fd Bde, 4 May 1915.
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Canadian A rtillery  hauling an 18-pounder gun into position. [Library and Archives Canada PA 
022713]
battery, both officers and men, join me in expressing to you our 
most sincere regrets and deepest sympathy.”75 Gunner Polleys was 
the last New Brunswick gunner to die in the Second Battle of Ypres. 
New Brunswick, and indeed all Canadian gunners with 1st Division, 
had much to be proud of. As much as they felt the effects of wicked 
German counter-battery fire, their own shrapnel shells broke or 
blunted nearly every enemy lunge forward behind all three German 
gas attacks against Ypres. Later in May, a flood of letters home from 
the front filled Canadians in about their little army’s stand east of 
Ypres as well as about the losses suffered. On 25 May 1915 citizens 
of Moncton and all over southeastern New Brunswick gathered at 
Bend View Square to remember the first four members of “Anderson’s 
Battery” killed during the Great War in what the papers called a 
“Solemn and impressive service in memory of Moncton’s fallen 
heroes.” Eleven other members of the battery were wounded in April 
and at least that many more again in the first week of May. “I know 
where all the Moncton boys are buried,” Major Anderson wrote to the
75 Letter printed in Moncton Transcript, 29 May 1915, 7.
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Moncton Times, “and made a mark on the map so that anyone can 
locate them should anything happen to me.”76
Combat during the first part of 1915 greatly influenced the 
development of the British— and Canadian— artillery, and not least 
the contribution of New Brunswick’s gunners. In June 1915 Lieutenant- 
Colonel Beverley Armstrong passed up the chain of command “an 
offer from the Officers, nco s and Men of the 3rd Regiment, Canadian 
Garrison Artillery at Saint John to raise a battery for service at the 
front.” The unit was in fact dismayed at the manner in which its 
members had been dispersed in the first and second contingents. “The 
3rd Regt., C.G.A., has responded nobly to the call of the Empire in 
N.C.O’s and men as well as officers; 534 enrolled or former N.C.O’s 
and men of the Corps have already enlisted with C.E.Fs. These men 
have joined every branch of the service and no unit that has yet gone 
has been identified with our Corps.” Armstrong noted that the 3rd 
Regiment, with its pre-war role in moveable fortress armament of both 
heavy and lighter calibre guns, could organise a field or heavy artillery 
unit, whatever was needed.77
That summer the 3rd Regiment continued to raise drafts intended 
to provide reinforcements for the heavy artillery overseas, but new 
requirements then opened the way for the contribution most closely 
associated with New Brunswick. The German advantage in heavy, 
long-ranged artillery in the battles of 1915 helped fuel a political crisis 
in Britain that resulted in the creation of a Ministry of Munitions 
for rapid expansion in the production of artillery weapons and 
ammunition. A  leading priority was for “siege” guns and howitzers 
larger than the 60-pounders of the existing heavy artillery, including 
6-inch, 8-inch and 9.2-inch howitzers, which fired shells of 100, 200, 
and 290 pounds respectively. In response to calls from the British War 
Office to recruit units to crew the new big guns, the 3rd Regiment 
raised two batteries, the 4th and 6th, among the nine siege batteries 
organised by Canada in the fall of 1915 to the spring of 1916. Later 
in 1916 the regiment established a depot siege battery on Partridge 
Island that recruited and trained more than 600 personnel who went
76 Letter from Major S.B. Anderson printed in Moncton Times, 7 July 1915, 6.
77 Armstrong to AAG, 6th Division, Halifax, 21 June 1915, File 131-1-4, LAC, RG 
24, Box 4555.
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overseas in 1917-18 to help expand the Canadian siege artillery to 
twelve batteries strengthened from four to six large howitzers each.78
The 3rd Regiment’s coastal defence battery continued in service 
on Partridge Island until the end of the war, filling an important and 
unexpected new role in protecting the port of Saint John against 
German submarines that began to make transatlantic raids in late 
1916. As young recruits in the coastal battery gained experience and 
reached the minimum age of nineteen for overseas service, they joined 
the depot siege battery, which in turn assisted the coastal battery in 
local defence when submarines were known to operating in Canadian 
waters. The 3rd Regiment thus provides a striking example of how 
in the First World War the militia garrison artillery fulfilled its 
traditional role of home defence, while making a signal contribution 
in meeting unheralded needs on the fighting front overseas.
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